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REPLY TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Re: Joanne Statement No. 2 (Brief at 12): 
The policy on Brad's life named Glade as the beneficiary. Question 31(f) on the 
application asked, "State purpose of insurance and nature of Owner's insurable interest." 
The applicants, Brad and Glade, answered, "Buy Sell/Partner." They did not answer 
"Buy/Sell Partner." The first and actual answer suggests the applicants had a dual 
intention. The agent who took the applications, Sheldon Hansen, testified that he was 
authorized to take the applications by the partners because they were partners, even had 
no buy-sell agreement existed. Trial Transcript, pp. 137-141. 
Re: JoAnne Statement No. 3 (Brief at 12-13): Buchi Children's Statement No. 13 (Brief 
at 11): 
On July 14, 1997, the partnership sold its two stations (real property and 
buildings) to Blackett Oil Company. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 11. The partnership 
did no business after that date. The partnership, however, did not sell all its assets 
including personal property to Blackett Oil and there was no evidence to that effect 
received at trial. See Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (June 5, 2003) pp. 4-5 and Exhibit A.1 In response to Glade's 
]The trial court declined to sign the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law 
that the defendants proposed. Ruling and Order, June 18, 2003. 
-1-
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objection, the trial court vacated its prior "finding" that University Texaco's sale to 
Blackett Oil included all its personal property. Ruling and Order (June 18, 2003). 
Re: JoAnne Statement No. 4 (Brief at 13): 
JoAnne states that "Buchi and Parduhn had a fairly loose business arrangement." 
Although Glade is not sure what this means, the testimony at pages 23 and 55 of the trial 
transcript do not support it. 
Re: Joanne Statement No. 7 (Brief at 13): 
Glade's testimony was that he understood that if the partnership was dissolved 
because of a partner's death (it was not), then the surviving partner after the 1984 
Amendment would be obligated under the buy-sell agreement to pay $100,000 received 
from insurance proceeds to the deceased partner's survivors. Trial testimony (Parduhn), 
pp. 28-29, 43-44. Glade did not testify that he understood his potential obligation under 
the buy-sell agreement to be $300,000, as JoAnne's statement implies. He understood it 
to be, at most, $100,000. 
Re: JoAnne Statements No. 20-22 (Brief at 17): 
An accounting by the partnership during its winding-up phase was not a subject 
of the August 2001 trial. The partnership, furthermore, was not a party at that time. As 
surviving partner, Glade did take charge of winding up the affairs of the partnership, as 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-34. The trial court, following the August 2001 
trial, agreed that Parduhn had the legal authority to do so. Memorandum Decision 
-2-
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(August 27, 2001) at 3. Section 48-1-34 does not require that Glade have consulted with 
the deceased partner's heirs or obtained their approval, as is implied. The partnership 
had to defend two additional lawsuits and paid judgments entered in those matters. Trial 
Testimony (Parduhn) pp. 38-39 (identifying actions brought by Guardian State Bank and 
Republic Leasing). 
Re: Buchi Children's Statement No. 8 (Brief at 10): 
It is stated that the "intent was that Brad Buchi's wife and two children would 
receive $300,000 if he were to pass away." This was not Glade's intent and he testified 
to the contrary. Trial Testimony (Parduhn) pp. 28-29, 43-44. The attribution is to non-
partner Lissa Buchi's testimony (pp. 102-106). Moreover, each time Lissa was asked 
her understanding of how the $300,000 proceeds were to be distributed if Brad died, 
Glade's objection to the question asked was sustained. See p. 103 (lines 5-17); p. 106 
(lines 2-8).2 
2Lissa went on to claim that the trial court (J. Murphy) in her divorce had decreed 
that the proceeds of the $300,000 Northern policy were to be kept unencumbered 
and were to go to her children. Trial Testimony, pp. 106-107. Judge Lubeck, 
however, explicitly disregarded this testimony. Memorandum Decision (August 
27, 2001) at 2. The decrees entered in her divorce contain no such holding, 
although they do refer to a Midland policy. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 21, ^ 7. 
Moreover, the court in the divorce could not have imposed restraints on a policy 
that Glade, not Brad, owned. 
-3-
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Re: Buchi Children's Statement No. 10 (Brief at 10): 
It is stated that "the partners routinely paid personal debts out of [the partnership] 
account, such as house payments, car payments and other personal obligations." This 
statement is attributed to Glade's testimony at page 47. No such trial testimony is 
reported, at least not at that page. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Overview. 
At page 38 of her Brief, Jo Anne Buchi urges the Supreme Court to "reject 
Parduhn's never ceasing efforts to deny this family the life insurance proceeds Brad 
Buchi intended them to get." This is, at least, an overreaching aspersion, given that in 
the application for the life insurance policy at issue Brad Buchi explicitly designated 
Glade Parduhn to be the sole beneficiary of the proceeds payable on his death, should he 
die. Brad also agreed that Glade would own the policy. 
Brad did not name his wife, Lissa, as the beneficiary. He did not name his 
children as the beneficiary.3 He certainly did not name JoAnne Buchi as the 
3The evidence clearly indicates that in those instances where Brad "intended" to 
provide for his family by the purchase of life insurance, he purchased separate life 
insurance for that purpose and explicitly designated his wife and children as the 
beneficiary of those policies. Thus, in 1989, Brad applied for an additional 
Northern policy to benefit his wife (Lissa, not JoAnne) and children separate from 
the two policies he and Glade purchased on each other's life. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 5. At the time, Brad's life was also insured by a $572,000 Executive Life 
policy, which designated Lissa Buchi and family as beneficiary. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 3 (Application, Question 18); Trial Testimony (S. Hansen), pp. 144-147; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
beneficiary4, whom he would not marry until after he later divorced Lissa. Nor did Brad 
name the partnership as beneficiary. 
The best and only competent evidence of whom Brad in 1989 intended to have 
the proceeds of Northern Policy No. NL00989085 should he die, is that person whom he 
concurred be designated the beneficiary of proceeds payable under that policy. On that 
one policy, Brad appointed his partner, Glade Parduhn, as the person who was to receive 
all the proceeds of insurance payable on his death.5 The Supreme Court in its decision 
Trial Testimony (Lissa Buchi), pp. 116-118. Brad's life in 1989 was insured in the 
additional amount of $200,000, by still another, earlier purchased policy from 
Northern. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3 (Application, Question 18). Brad's life was 
also insured by Midland Life for $100,000, which the court in Brad and Lissa's 
divorce (decree entered 1992) ordered be maintained for the benefit of Brad's 
minor children. Trial Testimony (Lissa Buchi), pp. 119-120; Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 21, p. 5. 
4
 Jo Anne's Addendum at Tab No. 10 includes a Stipulation from Brad and 
JoAnne's divorce. This Stipulation was not an exhibit at trial. To the best of 
counsel's knowledge, this is the first time this document has been revealed. It is 
nonetheless interesting, because it establishes that a year prior to his death Brad 
agreed to maintain insurance on his life in the amount of $100,000 and designate 
Jo Anne as the beneficiary of that policy. ffl[ 8-9. This exhibit, if anything, 
establishes Brad's intention to provide for Jo Anne in the event of his death by 
purchasing life insurance that expressly named her as the beneficiary. It 
contradicts JoAnne's contemporary argument that Brad intended (which she argues 
is the basis of an award in equity) her to have the benefits of an insurance policy 
that did not name her as a beneficiary, and which was purchased three years before 
Brad married her. 
5In response to Question 13 A of the application for insurance, the applicants 
(Glade and Brad) designated "Glade Leon Parduhn" to be the beneficiary and 
described Glade's relationship to Brad as "partner." The cover page of policy No. 
NL00989085 states: 
-5-
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in this case on September 6, 2002, held that Brad's and Glade's, and the policy's 
designation of Glade as the beneficiary was clear and unambiguous. Absent compelling 
evidence and rationale to the contrary, "the designated beneficiary in a policy of 
insurance is entitled to the entire proceeds on maturity of the contract." Zolintakis v. 
Orfanos, 119 F.2d 571 (10th Cir.) (interpreting Utah law), cert, denied 62 S.Ct. 62, 314 
U.S.630, 86L.Ed. 506(1941). 
Although contractually entitled to receive all insurance benefits payable on 
Brad's death, Glade would have been required by a second contract, a prior buy-sell 
agreement between Glade and Brad, to pass through $100,000 to Brad's wife and 
"survivors" had the buy-sell agreement survived the dissolution of the partnership. In 
return for the $100,000 paid (less possibly offsets for what Brad owed Glade), Glade 
would have received Brad's 50% interest in the partnership and its assets. The Supreme 
Court, consistent with decisions in other states, held, however, that the buy-sell 
agreement did not survive the dissolution of the partnership on July 14, 1997.6 Hence, it 
was unenforceable by Brad's survivors. 
We will pay the proceeds if we receive due written 
proof that the Insured died while this policy was in 
force. Payment will be made to the Beneficiary 
named in the application 
See Plaintiff s Trial Exhibit 3. 
6The partnership's dissolution preceded Brad's death by approximately two-and-a-
half to three weeks. 
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Had the Supreme Court's September 2002 analysis stopped here, all the Mr 
insurance proceeds would have been, hy i milnu'i pavubu hi < iliulc 1 lr would navr no 
conliailiLtl o'hlij'.itinii in pas ns n id |iia<l\ "survivors" $100,000, or any other portion 
ot the proceeds, per his and Brad's buy-sell agreement as amended in 1984. Brad's 
"survivors," however, would not necessarily have been left out oi AM. equation u 
affairs of the partnership would lia . . . . =• !n - p 
law; alter payiiiu nl ol pailiu i • •• would have been made and 
the distribution,1-; tu partners would have been determined; and Brad's share would have 
been paid to his estate.7 In re Estate of Brad Kevin BuchL Third District Court (Salt 
Lake County), Probate Case No ()739Ui ^)4, Biad's heirs, \\\u\ imdutle seuin! i,\ 11• 
JoAnne, would have ili\ nlnl any sum miiamim.1 JIIUT pavnirnl ol approved claims 
against the estate filed by Brad's creditors. 
As part of its September 6, 2002 decision, however, a majority of the Supreme 
Court decided that Glade, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 3 I A 21 10 J, had "losf hr, 
insurable interest in Brail's 1,!./ w lien 11 it • pantnetship w us dissoh ni just prim lo Brad's 
7
 Jo Anne Buchi has charged that Glade Parduhn has dissipated the partnerships 
money. On the partnership's sale of its two stations in 1997, the proceeds went 
straight into an account at Associated Title. Monies, today, remain in that account 
at Associated Title and are drawing interest, subject to a final partnership 
accounting. 
-7-
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death.8 There are several problems with this holding, the most significant of which is 
that Jo Anne Buchi and Brad's children never pleaded the statute as an affirmative 
defense. The Supreme Court did not address and thus did not decide Glade's argument 
that the defense had been waived due to defendants' failure to plead it, even though he 
clearly made that argument to the trial court, clearly made it to the Supreme Court 
(Appellant's Brief, Jan. 24, 2002, at 7-39), and despite clear prior precedent that 
affirmative defenses based on statutes are waived if not pleaded. See e.g., Golding v. 
Ashley Central Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), 
12(b) and 12(h). 
The Supreme Court's failure to decide Glade's argument that defendants' 
statutory defense had been waived was then compounded when the trial court, on 
remand, refused to consider any evidence other than what had been presented at trial on 
August 21, 2001 and entered a judgment awarding all the proceeds to the same persons 
it had before. 
The trial court's determination that JoAnne and Brad's children were equitably 
entitled to the proceeds without taking additional evidence was error. It was error 
8According to virtually all authorities on the issue, including prior Utah case law, 
"insurable interest" in the life of an insured is determined when the insurance is 
purchased. It is not determined when the insured dies and the rights of a 
beneficiary are not impaired because the earlier relationship that established an 
insurable interest has been terminated. See Appellant's Brief at 53, n.18. There is 
no language in § 31A-21-104 that requires insurable interest to exist at any time 
other than when the insurance is purchased (i.e., when the interest is acquired). 
-8-
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because there was no reasonable notice to Glade in advance ot the August 21, 2u0 1 nml 
that the issue to be tried would be who was equilablv entitled In tin- in ainitiet ptoeeeds, 
as opposed In M IKI \\ JS entitled In tliun under the two contracts at issue. There was no 
adequate notice because the statute had not been pleaded as a defense. 
B. An Award of the Insurance Proceeds to Defendants on Equitable Grounds 
Cannot be Supported Where a Defense Predicated on Section 31A-21-104 
was Waived by Defendants' Failure to Plead it. 
1 the holding sl.itnl L liie 1 'tali \upieme Court • Golding v. Ashley Central Irr. 
Co., 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990), that an affirmative defense based on a statute is 
waived if it Is not pleaded, still the law ii 11 Jtah? If it is, then defendants' defense to 
Glade's contract claim should have ixeh decreed v an 
uoiding ease as precedent, it is difficult to understand 
how an affirmative defense based on §31 A-21-104 cannot have been waived by the 
defendants' failure to plead it. Neither the statute nor an alleged "loss" of insurable 
interest was pleaded in defendants' Amended Answer, K.2 /5, Neither was it v:\vr 
mentioned in response to ( ilulv s pretiutl motions lor iinittian finf^ inetif oi p.irtial 
suinmaiy judgment, nor in support of defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
For that matter, it is a defense that Brad's children did not ever plead or mention prior to 
the August 2001 triai :\oi ...d they raise it ii i their Brie I in the puoi appeal " "it1 -let "list 
was raised only l»v ioAiim made loi ihr insi linit1 in .i irpnied motion in limine filed 
ui 11 \ w eeks prior to the December 2000 trial setting, and months after the deadline for 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
amendment of pleadings had passed. Glade immediately objected to JoAnne's belated 
presentation of this defense in the guise of a motion in limine and moved to strike on the 
ground that Jo Anne had waived this defense by her failure to plead it. R. 1147. JoAnne 
promptly withdrew her motion. R. 1206. Its next mention was in JoAnne's Pretrial 
Brief, filed less than a week prior to the August 2001 trial, where it now was presented 
as the cornerstone of her entitlement argument. R.1295. Again, Glade moved to strike, 
R.1399, 1401, but his motion was denied. R.1412 (Lubeck, J.). 
JoAnne invokes the law of the case doctrine in support of her position that the 
Supreme Court cannot revisit its earlier decision with regard to its earlier failure to 
address and rule on Glade's waiver argument. Specifically, she states that "the Supreme 
Court has decided the law of this case." Thus, she "should not be obliged to argue this 
issue once again." Brief at 39. Although JoAnne then goes on to provide her views 
concerning the merits of the statute, she, interestingly, makes no effort to contend that 
she pleaded the statute as an affirmative defense or that she did not waive the defense by 
her failure to plead it. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is "a legal doctrine under which a decision made 
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding on successive stages of the same 
litigation." Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah 
1995) (emphasis added); see ako Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). The 
doctrine is usually applied at the trial court level. At the trial court level, a ruling by that 
-10-
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court, notwithstanding the doctrine, can be changed at any time prior to the entry o f * 
final judgment if good cause exists to do so. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, ^ 1 
1306 (I Jtah • Vpi > 1 994); Salt Lake City Corp. \ Jani.es Constructors, 761 P.2d42, -t-i 
(I Hah App. 1988). Circumstances in which a trial court is warranted in reconsidering an 
earlier decision include if "manifest injustice" would result from a failure to reconsider a 
ruling and if "a court needs to correct its own errors," Trembly, supra .^ iaL s. 
O'Neil. K4h P M h'U, o<> ' u " 11 Hah \pp |, t a l denied XV) l> ?d SKS (Utah 1993). . 
The Supreme Court, in Thurston, recognized that it possesses and retains 
authority to correct its own errors or oversight where a case has come to it on a second 
appeal. Correction is appropriate, for example, if the "court, is convinced thai lis pn< »r 
decision was c I carl) eiioncniis aniJI w-iKild work a ttiaailrsl in|iiNluv '' ' I hurston, supra, 
ncie, the Supreme Court on the first appeal apparently 
overlooked Parduhn's waiver argument; notwithstanding that it was clearly presented 
and argued to the court and clearly preserved for appeal by (i lade s I wo motions to 
strike. The precedent tl lat si ippoi ts Glade's w ai\ er argi iment is cleat ; and its <" - er> 
purpose is 1o pu i/aul ;;urprise and injustice. . ..'.. , . . , . 
The trial court (Lubeck, J.) ignored Golding and also Rules 8(c), 12(b), and 12(h) 
ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when on August 20, 200 J il ckined lilade s mniiim 
to strike Jo Anne's unpleaded affn mati\ c defense I 'he trial couifs ihMual ul*( Made s 
motion was ei i oi It was of consequence, because it allowed a defense that was never .. 
-11-
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pleaded to become the eventual basis of a legal ruling that eviscerated contract rights 
that a majority of the Supreme Court, on the first appeal, decreed should have (except 
for the unpleaded statute) routed the proceeds to Glade. Under the facts of this case, 
given defendants' failure to plead the statute, this result is error, subverts the rules of 
civil procedure, and affects an injustice. 
The law of the case doctrine, thus, should not preclude the Supreme Court from 
now deciding a threshold issue that it did not decide the first time this case was before it. 
C. An Award of All the Life Insurance Proceeds Payable on Brad Buchi's 
Death, to JoAnne Buchi and Brad Buchl under Northern Policy No. 
NL00989085. Cannot be Sustained on Equitable Grounds Where the 
August 21, 2001 Trial Did Not Fairly Contemplate a Trial Concerning 
Equitable Entitlement to the Proceeds and the Trial Court Refused to 
Consider Additional Evidence Relevant to Equity Proffered by Glade 
Parduhn. 
The quagmire and confusion that has resulted in this case is exactly what Rules 
8(c), 12(b) and 12(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and case law precedent headed by 
the Golding decision are intended to prevent: an adjudication of rights on legal theories 
and statutes not fairly contemplated by the parties going into a trial. An examination of 
the pleadings in this case and the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to 
motions for summary judgment indicate that the August 2001 trial was to be a trial about 
contract rights: specifically those arising under a contract of life insurance and the 
partners' buy-sell agreement. Issues concerning the first included the deceased's alleged 
intent, alleged ambiguity of the contract of insurance, and what the terms of contract 
-12-
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provided. Concerning the latter, issues included whether the agreement survived the 
amoi iiit fron :t $100,000 to $300,000 Eqi litable ei ititlement thougl 1, w as not fairl) 
contemplated. 
The Appellees' response to this argument is to argue that all evidence relevant to 
an equitable distribution was considered at the trial held Vugust 21, 2001, because the 
trial • :c)i n t judge said lie 1 lad considered all tl le e^  idence concei ning equit> that he 
needed and desired to hear. Judge Lubeck stated, in his most recent decision, that his 
award based on equity was based only on evidence received at the earlier trial (even 
though 1 lis decision comments on. "evidence" and "persuasive evidence" that was not 
presented at trial, bi it v - as ii iti odi iced in tl le absence of s < ' identiai ) r support in 
memoranda filed by defendants on remand). For example, defendants have made 
conclusory statements in memoranda and argument on remand concerning the special 
nature of the relationship between Brad and JoAnne (e.g., JoAnne's Brief at 25), 
still married to Brad when he died, that she was the personal representative of Brad's 
estate, and that Brad did not leave a will Had she gone any further; had she, for 
example, testified that her divorce proceeding versus Brad was about to be dismissed, 
on happily thereafter, or that Brad, as she now argues, "intended" her to have the 
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insurance proceeds of a policy purchased before he married her, then Glade would have 
offered evidence of impeachment under Rule 609, which he had earlier indicated he 
would in response to JoAnne's April 2001 motion in limine to exclude introduction of 
her felony convictions at trial. R.1242. The trial court did not grant JoAnne's motion in 
limine to exclude impeachment by use of her convictions at trial, as Jo Anne now 
contends in her Brief at 27. Instead, the trial court judge took the motion and Glade's 
opposition under advisement and indicated he would rule on the motion if JoAnne's 
testimony put her credibility at issue. R. 1260, 1412. 
Findings of fact made by a trial court, in determining equitable claims and issues, 
are entitled to deference. There is a presumption that the findings are correct. A 
presumption of correctness, however, cannot be sustained where there exists material 
evidence that the trier-of-fact has refused to consider or where the appellant has not had 
fair opportunity to present material evidence. 
The Supreme Court's ruling on September 6, 2002, assuming it to be correct, 
radically altered the focus of this case from contract issues to equity. Entitlement to the 
proceeds based solely on equity was not fairly contemplated as an issue to be tried by 
Glade Parduhn, going into the August 2001 trial, precisely because defendants had not 
timely pleaded a defense based on § 31A-21 -104. 
The trial court on remand could not, as it says it did, make a sound decision in 
equity based solely on evidence presented to it in the August 2001 trial, where it ignored 
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all contrary evidence that on remand Glade proffered, and where it divined intent from 
an agreement that the Supreme Court had held to be unenforceable. 
D. Given the Supreme Court's September 6, 2002 Ruling, There Does Not 
Exist a Written Instrument Which Can Serve as the Basis for a Non-
testamentary Transfer of the Insurance Proceeds Directly to Jo Anne Buchi 
or Brad's children. 
Calling it the "law of the case," Joanne insists that half the insurance proceeds go 
directly to her and that they bypass the partnership and, more to the point, Brad's estate. 
Brief at 25. Given JoAnne's fiduciary duty to the probate estate and its creditors, it is 
unclear how this Court and the trial court, on equitable grounds, can ignore her duty and 
condone her request that half the insurance proceeds be awarded to her, personally. 
JoAnne's argument, furthermore, misrepresents the scope of the Ruling that 
Judge Stirba made on May 24,2000 (and as later amended in response to Glade's 
motion for a "new trial"). Judge Stirba did not decree that the insurance proceeds, as a 
matter of law, were to pass one-half to Jo Anne Buchi and half to Brad's children. She 
did find and rule that as of the date of Brad's death, Jo Anne was still Brad's lawful wife, 
as a divorce decree had not yet been entered. With that marriage status as a premise, 
Judge Stirba held that any sum that might pass to Jo Anne and to Brad's children per the 
partners' buy-sell agreement, if that agreement survived the partnership and remained 
enforceable, would be a non-testamentary transfer recognized by Utah Code Ann. § 75-
6-201. The Supreme Court, however, held in deciding the earlier appeal that the 
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partnership was dissolved just prior to Brad's death and that the buy-sell agreement, 
therefore, did not survive dissolution. A non-enforceable buy-sell agreement cannot 
be the basis of a non-testamentary transfer. 
A life insurance contract can be the conduit for a non-testamentary transfer, 
which will bypass an insured decedent's estate, as to the person the policy designates as 
the beneficiary of the contract. The Supreme Court, however, held that the contract of 
insurance unambiguously designated Glade as the beneficiary entitled to the proceeds of 
insurance. 
A non-testamentary transfer, by law, must be based on a written instrument. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-6-201. Given the Supreme Court's ruling on September 6, 2002, there 
is no written instrument capable of accomplishing that objective. 
Brad's children, understandably, do not want to share any of the insurance 
proceeds with creditors of their father's estate. While JoAnne's reluctance is equally 
strong or stronger, it is less understandable and defensible given her position as the 
court-appointed personal representative of Brad's probate estate. 
Glade contends that the proceeds should be awarded to him as the beneficiary due 
him under a contract of insurance, with no obligation to pass through a portion of those 
proceeds under a buy-sell agreement that did not survive dissolution of the partnership. 
If this Court, however, determines on the basis of § 31A-21-104 that the proceeds must 
be distributed to someone equitably entitled to them, then the proceeds should be 
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awarded to Glade. If not to Glade, they should be awarded to University Texaco. If not 
to University Texaco, then they should be awarded to Brad's estate. An equitable award 
cannot, however, bypass Brad's estate on the ground, as Jo Anne now contends (Brief at 
25), that the proceeds of insurance should go directly to her as a non-testamentary 
transfer. There is little basis in equity for bypassing Brad's estate and the creditors 
whose claims in that case have been approved. This Court should be especially careful 
in affirming and endorsing such a result, especially where the interests of the estate have 
not been articulated in this case and JoAnne, in her capacity as personal representative, 
has chosen instead to champion a position that is in her self-interest and contrary to the 
interests of the estate in probate. 
CONCLUSION 
Glade Parduhn respectfully asks that the ruling and decision of the trial court on 
remand be vacated and that the relief requested at page 64 of his Appellant's Brief be 
granted. 
DATED this jl? day of March, 2004. 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P. Bry^fi Fishburn, Esq., 
Attorneys for Appellant, Glade Parduhn 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF 
OF THE APPELLANT, GLADE PARDUHN were mailed in the United States mail, 
first class postage prepaid, on the I / day of March, 2004, to the following persons: 
Martin S. Tanner, Esq. 
c/o American Pension Services 
11027 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Susan Black Dunn, Esq. 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN & DUNN 
230 South 500 East, Suite #460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Nanci Bockelie, Esq. 
BOCKELIE LAW OFFICE, L.C 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT O t l 11 t l l l ^ 7 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
